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COWS IN HOT WATER: REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK GRAZING THROUGH THE
FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst the deluge of assorted and sundry American eco-
logical disasters, environmental impairment caused by live-
stock grazing is perhaps the best kept secret. Chronic over-
grazing generates extensive environmental degradation of
federal lands, including more damage to wild flora and fauna,
soil, habitats, and water than any other land use.1 In partic-
ular, livestock use of the public range pollutes and ravishes
delicate riparian areas,2 which are integral to the sustained
prosperity of the rangeland ecosystem. 3 To put it mildly, the
environmental state of America's rangeland is in crisis.
The Bureau of Land Management [hereinafter BLM],4
the federal agency principally responsible for the administra-
tion of grazing on federal lands, leases approximately 170
million acres of public land for grazing purposes. 5 In the
past, administrative reform of grazing regulations has
yielded very little meaningful change in the protection of the
public rangeland.6 This trend has continued, as recent at-
tempts to revise rangeland management law7 have become
1. See infra notes 31-45, 54-62 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
3. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC RANGELANDS: SOME RIPARIAN AR-
EAS RESTORED BUT WIDESPREAD IMPROVEMENT WILL BE SLOW (GAO
REPORT)(1988).
4. The BLM is the principal federal agency responsible for the administra-
tion of grazing on federal lands. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
5. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MANAGING THE
NATION'S PUBLIC LANDS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTE-
RIOR BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR 1991 (BLM REPORT) at 13
(1991).
6. See infra notes 114-17, 142-44 and accompanying text.
7. "Rangeland management law" is a segment of public land law stemming
from federal legislation over the management of the public rangelands. See
George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Ex-
tent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 536-38 (1982)[herein-
after Coggins I]. Rangeland management law has been largely ignored by the
legal community. Id. at 537. However, recent developments have led to in-
creased attention by legal commentators. Id. at 537-38.
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mired in political controversy.8 The BLM's latest proposed
grazing industry regulations, which emphasized fee increases
and economic incentives for ecologically responsible grazing
practices, were thwarted by political opponents. 9 Most im-
portantly, reform of rangeland management law has continu-
ally failed to address the pivotal problem associated with live-
stock grazing today: federal lands cannot adequately support
the number of livestock currently grazing on them.10
Although past attempts at reform have been largely inef-
fective, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1 may pro-
vide an opportunity to circumvent the political quagmire. 2
Riparian areas scourged by "nonpoint pollution sources," 13 in
this case livestock grazing, merit federal statutory protection.
Rather than promulgating new grazing industry regulations,
a highly controversial and politically sensitive endeavor, the
BLM should regulate livestock grazing through the nonpoint
pollution source provisions of the Clean Water Act. By re-
stricting livestock access to riparian areas, the overall
number of livestock capable of grazing on federal lands will
be significantly reduced, sparing the western rangeland from
desertification.14
In section II, this comment explains the ecological signifi-
cance of riparian ecosystems, the damage caused to them by
8. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 127-38, 144 and accompanying text.
10. BLM lands tend to be "hot, dry, barren, rocky, and/or steeply sloped."
See LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING 23 (1991). The
severely limited amount of forage, and the large number of cattle and other
livestock that graze on these lands inevitably results in overgrazing. See id. at
31-32. In 1987, for example, 1.5 million cattle grazing on federal BLM and For-
est Service lands consumed 18.2 million animal unit months. Id. at 571. An
animal unit month is "the amount of forage consumption necessary for the sus-
tenance of one cow or its equivalent for 1 month." 43 C.F.R. § 4100.05 (1986).
11. The Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988) [here-
inafter Clean Water Act].
12. The last significant addition to rangeland management law was the
Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978. See infra notes 118-22 and accom-
panying text. Since then, Congress has failed to enact legislation to alleviate
the continuing destruction of federal lands. Alternatively, revisions to the
Clean Water Act have been more frequently and politically feasible. The 1987
Clean Water Act amendments directly addressed nonpoint pollution sources,
and new amendments may possibly be enacted this year. See infra note 294
and accompanying text.
13. "Nonpoint pollution source" is an amorphous term that evades clear def-
inition. See infra note 150-52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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livestock grazing, and the remarkable capability of these ar-
eas to be revitalized. 15 In addition, section II looks at past
and present attempts by the BLM to address the ecological
problems caused by grazing.' 6 Lastly, section II examines
the legal development of nonpoint pollution source control
mechanisms under the Clean Water Act. 
17
Section III analyzes administrative reform efforts, con-
cluding that the primary method of achieving successful re-
form, namely reduction of livestock numbers, is never di-
rectly addressed.' 8 Section III also evaluates the potential
benefits and detriments of regulation of riparian ecosystems
under the Clean Water Act.19 In section IV, potential impedi-
ments to implementation are addressed and statutory solu-
tions are proposed.2 °
II. BACKGROUND
A. Livestock Grazing: An Ecological Disaster
Although the problems associated with livestock grazing
have been shrouded in public anonymity, they constitute the
single largest contributor to environmental degradation of
public lands.21 Riparian ecosystems are especially suscepti-
ble to environmental damage caused by decreases in water
quantity and quality.22 However, studies have shown that ri-
parian ecosystems have an amazing capacity to rejuvenate if
left alone.23
1. Riparian Ecosystems
A riparian ecosystem is the area around a water source,
usually a river or lake.24 They are delicate, biodiverse eco-
15. See infra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 78-144 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 145-222 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 225-49 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 250-93 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
21. The pertinent regulatory agencies involved in the administration of the
public range acknowledge that livestock grazing is a major cause of widespread
environmental damage on federal rangelands. See infra notes 55-60, 223-24
and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
24. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94. Riparian systems sometimes occur in ar-
eas not located near surface water, because they are sustained by slow moving
ground water trickling up to the surface. Id.
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systems that have a high water tables, but are not under
water. 25  Riparian areas are wetland ecosystems, or "eco-
tones," a transitional system providing both land and aquatic
habitats.2 s
Riparian ecosystems comprise only a small portion of fed-
eral rangeland, but are a vital part of the public range.27 The
vegetation around riparian areas provides substantial bene-
fits, including:
(1) [S]tream bank stabilization and erosion control that
reduces bioload sediment, (2) filtering and entrapment of
sediments and silt, (3) stability against stream damage by
high-flow events, (4) ground-water recharge through ab-
sorption, (5) shade to maintain stream temperatures suit-
able for aquatic resources, (6) organic debris that enters
the aquatic food chain, and (7) overhanging bank cover
from tree roots and shrubs that provide cover and terres-
trial insect food for fish.28
In addition, the streamside forest is a principal source of
instream nutrients servicing the rangeland ecological com-
munity.29 Particularly in arid climates, riparian ecosystems
are essential in maintaining the delicate natural balance, as
they provide shelter and sustenance for a wide variety of
wildlife.3 °
25. Id. Scientifically, "riparian ecosystem" is defined as: "wetland ecosys-
tems that have a high water table because of proximity to an aquatic system or
surface water." Id. A "riparian zone" is defined as "the strip of land bordering
surface waters whose vegetation depends on a high water table." Id. A "ripa-
rian area" generally describes "any area with riparian qualities." Id. For pur-
poses of this comment, the terms are used interchangeably.
26. See Jon M. Skovlin, Impacts of Grazing on Wetlands and Riparian
Habitat: A Review of Our Knowledge, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MAN-
AGEMENT 1004, 1085 (1984).
27. See ED CHANEY ET AL., LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WESTERN RIPARIAN AR-
EAS 2 (1990).
28. Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal Land Management Dis-
cretion: Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43,
46-47 (1986) (citing from WESTERN Div., AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y, MANAGEMENT
AND PROTECTION OF WESTERN RIPARIAN STREAM ECOSYSTEMS 6, 6 (1980)).
29. Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1002-04.
30. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94-95. "Riparian areas provide avenues
and cover for animal movements and migrations, assuring wide distribution,
minimum species inbreeding, and refuge from humans and their develop-
ments." Id. at 94.
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2. Effect of Livestock Grazing on Riparian Areas
Riparian zones cover less than 1% of western federal
lands,31 but they provide 81% of the forage consumed by live-
stock.3 2 The determinative sources of the widespread envi-
ronmental damage on federal rangelands are general over-
grazing and livestock grazing on delicate riparian areas.33
Grazing practices, in fact, have resulted in the mass destruc-
tion of riparian ecosystems on public lands.34 As much as
90% of public lands have been polluted by grazing practices.35
Environmental damage results because left alone, cattle
will consume all available vegetation in the riparian area
first.3 6 Due to the abundance of vegetation within a riparian
ecosystem, as well as its aquatic nature, cattle tend to graze
and remain in these areas. 37 In the higher mountainous re-
gions, riparian areas around small streams and lakes are es-
pecially sensitive to long-term debasement because of the
31. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 2.
32. Douglas M. Green and J. Boone Kauffman, Nutrient Cycling at the
Land-Water Interface: The Importance of the Riparian Zone, in PRACTICAL AP-
PROACHES TO RIPARIAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL WORKSHOP
61-68 (1989) (cited in JACOBS, supra note 10, at 95).
33. See Beverly I. Strassmann, Effects of Cattle Grazing and Haying on
Wildlife Conservation at National Wildlife Refuges in the United States, 11
ENVTL. MGMT. 35, 39-40 (1987).
34. A 1993 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report found that "ripa-
rian areas throughout the west were in the worst condition in history" due to
improper grazing management. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 5-6. By some esti-
mates, "perhaps only 10 percent of the original riparian habitat of the United
States remains today" and "about 6 percent of this amount continues to be lost
annually." Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1008-09. Another ecologist estimates
"70% of the West managed for ranching the vast majority of riparian areas have
been and are being significantly damaged by livestock." JACOBS, supra note 10,
at 95. The Arizona Game & Fish Department has reported that "97% of the
state's original riparian habitat has been lost, with ranching the major factor."
Id. at 99 (citing George Wuerthner, The Price is Wrong, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1990,
at 38-40).
35. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 107.
Experts estimate that 90% of the surface water on public land is
significantly polluted. In the West, sediments loosed by livestock, pol-
lutants washed off the overgrazed land, manure, urine, and dead cattle
are the main sources of water pollution in most ranching areas (which,
again, compose 70% of the West), as well as many downstream
waterways.
Id.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Id. Once cattle find a suitable area, "they stay indefinitely unless
strongly induced to move." Id.
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harsh climate, thin soil and low stream sediment levels.3" In
the lower riparian zones, defoliation decreases fertile bottom-
land soil.39 Moreover, simultaneously, water turbidity and
the amount of harmful pollutants, sediments and debris in
the water flow is increased.40 Because plant life helps to trap
water and keep the soil fertile, the absence of foliage creates a
barren floodplain, resulting in the extermination of nearby
plants, loss of groundwater, and reduction in the diversity of
animal habitat.41
The impact of livestock grazing on fish habitats is also
severe. Generally, most reports "show that heavy or uncon-
trolled grazing degrades habitat for fish."42 Overgrazing has
been cited by one authority as "the single greatest menace to
trout streams today."
43
Further, loss of vegetation results in increased sediment
in water sources, which is harmful to aquatic wildlife and
downstream fisheries. 44 Manure, urine and dead cattle car-
casses are deposited into water sources, contributing to the
spread of diseases such as salmonella, dysentery, and
giardia.45 The result is extensive pollution of federal waters.
3. Restoration of Riparian Areas
Despite a long history of documented abuse, some studies
strongly suggest that riparian ecosystems have a high restor-
38. Id. at 96.
39. Id.
40. The riparian vegetation acts as a sieve. It sucks up water for storage
and strains sediments washed down from the highlands. CHANEY, supra note
27, at 42. Sediments form into a fertile bottom layer of top soil. Id. When the
vegetation is removed, the water flows downhill unimpeded, especially during
rainy season, carrying excess water, topsoil, and other surrounding particles
into larger bodies of water. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96-97. The speed of the
water creates a steeper, narrow gorge through which water is funneled, thus
contributing to the overall destruction of riparian areas. See Strassman, supra
note 33, at 39-40.
41. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96-97.
42. Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1040-41.
43. Noel Rosetta, Herds, Herds on the Range, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 43,
45-46.
44. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 107.
45. Id. at 108-10. Cattle produce approximately 50 lbs. of excrement a day,
which, among other elements, contains large amounts of ammonia, nitrates, so-
dium, phosphates, and potassium. Id. at 108. In addition, cattle also displace
20 lbs. of urine, also high in ammonia, which has been shown to be hazardous to
humans and toxic to fish. Id.
[Vol. 351274
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ative capacity.4" Restoration would improve water quality as
well as provide relief for the abused rangeland habitats.47
Experimental fencing of damaged riparian ecosystems has
yielded successful regrowth of normal native plant species,
improvement in the filtering capacity of riparian zones, and
decreased water turbidity.48 However, some dispute does ex-
ist as to the efficiency and effectiveness of natural recovery
methods.49
In 1988, at the request of the Chair of the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office [hereinafter GAO]50 conducted its own analy-
sis of rangeland management of riparian areas. 1 The
purpose of the report was to identify specific examples of the
restorative capability of riparian systems, evaluate damage,
and develop grazing techniques which would minimize im-
pact on the riparian areas. 52 The GAO concluded that sev-
eral grazing techniques were available to alleviate the effects
of livestock grazing on riparian areas, but that the most effec-
tive method was simply to reduce or eliminate grazing in
those areas.53
4. Assessing the Damage
In completing its report on the condition of riparian ar-
eas on public lands, the GAO experienced resistance from
both grazing permitees and the BLM when investigating spe-
cific rangelands. 54 The GAO's eventual assessment of ripa-
rian area degradation, given the partial information avail-
able, was that there are "tens of thousands of miles of
riparian areas in the West, with only a small portion of them
46. See HAROLD F. HEADY & R. DENNIS CHILD, RANGELAND, ECOLOGY &
MANAGEMENT 454 (1994).
47. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 90-93.
48. Id.
49. Braun, supra note 28, at 50. In expressing concern over who will bear
the restorative costs, ranchers often question whether livestock actually dam-
age riparian areas at all. Id.
50. The General Accounting Office is an executive agency charged with re-
viewing, regulating, and proposing fiscal management policies for federal ad-
ministrative agencies and programs. See generally FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE
GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1979).
51. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
52. Id. at 2.
53. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-101 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3).
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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in good condition."55 Moreover, the GAO determined that
"[p]oorly managed livestock grazing is the major cause of de-
graded riparian habitat on federal rangelands."5
The BLM admits that considerable riparian degradation
exists and, as a consequence, it has developed management
and restorative practices which it contends will alleviate the
problem.57 However, agency efforts have been piecemeal and
inadequate in comparison to the amount of sites in need of
restoration.58 In addition, these programs do not address the
incompatible relationship between the bovine presence and
riparian area viability.59
The problem of grazing and the law of rangeland man-
agement are in need of urgent reform. As one author has
stated: "no other land use is so destructive in so many
ways."60 In addition to the decimation of riparian ecosys-
tems, a myriad of other environmental ills stem from grazing
on public lands.61 For example, desertification and flooding
are two problems linked to livestock grazing.62 Unfortu-
nately, there is no federal statute that sufficiently "scruti-
nizes" agency activity to make sure the rangeland is being
managed efficiently.
B. Regulation of Federal Rangelands
Federal regulation of the public rangeland was slow in
developing and inconsistent in application.63 Laws and ad-
ministrative agencies were designed principally to assist the
grazing industry in its exploitation of public lands.64 Only in
55. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96.
56. Id.
57. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. Less conservative estimates compiled
by other sources believe a much greater percentage of all riparian areas on pub-
lic lands have been degraded. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
58. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
59. See BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14.
60. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 33. However, the BLM maintains that the
public "rangelands are in better condition now than at any time in this cen-
tury." BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
61. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 33.
62. See Rosetta, supra note 43, at 47 (estimating that overgrazing has
helped put about 10% of U.S. land in a state of severe or very severe desertifica-
tion); see also William H. Schlesinger et al., Biological Feedbacks in Global
Desertification, SCIENCE, Mar. 2, 1990, at 1043 (describing the biological effect
and impact livestock have on removing topsoil and creating desert).
63. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
64. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536.
[Vol. 351276
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recent years have attempts been made to manage the public
range in an ecologically responsible manner.6 5
1. Historical Development of Rangeland Management
Federal rangeland management has historically been
controlled by powerful ranching interests. 66 The livestock in-
dustry's power encompassed both political and economic con-
trol.67 Using whatever means were necessary, the ranchers
essentially "claimed" dominion over the federal range.68
a. The Early Years
Livestock grazing was an established profession long
before federal regulation was instituted.69 Before 1934, the
public range was essentially a commons, characterized by
"ranching wars," "land grabs," and chronic overgrazing.70 In
1884, the estimated cattle population in 17 western states
reached as high as 35-40 million, as "forage fever" swept the
West. 7'
In 1905, Congress "set aside forest reserves from the un-
reserved public domain."72 The Forest Service promulgated
grazing regulations and for the first time charged a nominal
grazing fee of 20 to 35 cents per cow during the summer sea-
son. 73 However, the agency was heavily influenced in its pol-
65. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
66. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536.
67. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 13.
68. Id. Given that the ranchers had "great numbers of livestock and control
of huge amounts of land and crucial sources of precious water-and with a will-
ingness to use violence to get what they wanted-they banded together to form
what is known today as the livestock grazing industry." Id. Oftentimes, local
livestock associations established their own industry regulations. EVERETT
DALE, THE RANGE CATTLE INDUSTRY: RANCHING ON THE GREAT PLAINS FROM
1865 TO 1925, at 58 (1960). Eventually, "there gradually grew up in the range
cattle area a body of precedents, customs, and principles, the whole forming a
kind of unwritten law of the range as 'cow custom' which was in force and
respected throughout the region." Id. This is still going on today. See, e.g., Ed
Marston, Rocks and Hard Places, WILDERNESS, Spring 1991, at 38-45.
69. WILLIAM VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUS-
TRY AND GOVERNMENT 17-19 (1976).
70. Id. at 27-30.
71. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 11.
72. WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, U.S. FOREST SERVICE GRAZING AND RANGELANDS: A
HISTORY 4 (1985).
73. Id. at 55-60.
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icy formulation by ranching interests.74 Agency infiltration
continued as "[a] great many ranchers became district, forest,
regional, and national Forest Service range and administra-
tive officials."75 The subsequent regulatory agency estab-
lished by the Taylor Grazing Act was appropriately termed
the "Division of Grazing."76 It was later reorganized into the
Grazing Service, only to be controlled by ranching interests
as well.
7 7
b. The Bureau of Land Management
In 1946, the General Land Office 7 and the Grazing Ser-
vice7" reorganized to create the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment.80 The BLM is charged with the administration of 269
million acres, or about 41%, of all federally owned land.8 '
Most of the land under BLM's exclusive jurisdiction is arid
and semi-arid land, property that was not "grabbed" during
the "century of western land disposition."8 2  In the western
United States, 177 million acres, or 24% of eleven western
states, are managed by the BLM. s3 Of this land, 163 million
acres are used for ranching.
8 4
74. PHILLIP 0. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING
ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 60 (1960).
75. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17.
76. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. See also JACOBS, supra
note 10, at 17; WESLEY CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES OF
LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT 76 (1960).
77. See PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLU-
ENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 86
(1981); see also JACOBS, supra note 10, at 18.
78. The General Land Office was the first federal agency responsible for
managing public lands. See CULHANE, supra note 77, at 75.
79. The Grazing Service, originally named the Division of Grazing, existed
as an independent division of the Department of Interior. See CALEF, supra
note 76, at 76-77.
80. 11 Fed. Reg. 7876 (1946)
81. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 1 (1992). For purposes of this comment, "federal lands" and
"public lands" are synonymous.
82. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536, 541-47.
83. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 568. The "western United States" consists of:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Id.
84. Id. The permitees who use this acreage represent only 2% of the total
livestock industry. Id. at 25. Surprisingly, only 3% of all beef produced each
year in the U.S. grazes on public lands. Id. at 27. Thus, an enormous amount
of public land, and money, is spent to subsidize a small portion of all livestock
1278 [Vol. 35
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The administrative reformation of the General Land Of-
fice and the Grazing Service did not translate into reform of
rangeland management. The historical "vassal" relationship
of federal rangeland management agencies to powerful
ranching interests remained intact.8 5 Special interest "dis-
trict advisory boards," made up exclusively of ranchers,
strongly influenced BLM policy and rules, especially on the
vital issue of grazing lease levels.86 In effect, "the Forest Ser-
vice and BLM... functioned more as grazing industry tools
than true regulatory agencies. "87 It has been only within the
last twenty years, as public interest in "rangeland manage-
ment law" has increased, that the BLM's actions have been
scrutinized .8  Even today, however, the BLM is considered
by many to be "ineffectual and often downright subservient to
the users it is supposed to regulate."8 9
In 1987, the BLM produced an agency policy statement
regarding the management of riparian areas.90 The report
acknowledged the destructive capacity livestock grazing can
have on sensitive riparian environments and called, if imple-
mented, for planning to "maintain, restore, or improve" ripa-
rian zone "values."91 However, because the report was only a
"policy" it was distinguished from a BLM regulation and
therefore did not require compliance with a specific manage-
ment plan.92
There have been more recent attempts to manage ripa-
rian areas. The BLM's 1991 annual report makes reference
to a document entitled "Riparian-Wetland Initiatives for the
1990's."93 The BLM considers these initiatives to be "a
blueprint for managing riparian-wetlands" which "stresses a
holistic watershed management approach with participation
on an interdisciplinary, cooperative basis" while emphasizing
"management of the natural recovery process prior to consid-
food producers, who account for a negligible amount of American beef! Id. at
25-30.
85. See CULHANE, supra note 77, at 89-91.
86. Id.
87. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 19.
88. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536-37.
89. Id. at 552.
90. See Braun, supra note 28, at 66.
91. Id.
92. Id. (noting that the policy binds the BLM only to the extent that the
BLM chooses to be bound).
93. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
12791995]
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ering structural measures."94 The BLM has set goals and
specified degraded riparian areas it intends to restore.9 5
However, restoration will be only "used to show the multiple
benefits of improving riparian areas."96 Therefore, livestock
grazing will continue in riparian zones, defiling them even as
they are being restored. 7
2. The BLM's Statutory Authority
a. The Taylor Grazing Act
The BLM's statutory authority was developed under the
auspices of ranching interest influence. The Taylor Grazing
Act of 193498 was instituted to protect vested grazing inter-
ests against nomadic herding encroachment, as well as to rec-
ognize officially the grazing industry.9 9 The significant provi-
sions of the Taylor Act include: establishment of permit
systems, 100 grazing fees charged for use of federal lands,10 1
and organization of grazing advisory boards. 10 2 In practice,
the Taylor Act served as a legal tool used by ranching inter-
ests to fortify their "rights" to the public range. 10 3 Not sur-
prisingly, environmental concerns, such as determination of
the "carrying capacity" of livestock on public lands, were con-
tinually neglected after the passage of the Act,' 0 4 even
94. Id.
95. Id. The BLM estimates there are 500,000 acres of riparian-wetland
habitat under its jurisdiction. Of this, 174,000 miles of riparian areas are
targeted for restoration. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
98. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
99. See CALEF, supra note 76, at 52. The Taylor Grazing Act was instituted
by and named after Representative Edward Taylor, a Colorado rancher who
was a staunch proponent of ranching interests and "sworn enemy of conserva-
tionists." JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17; see also VOIGT, supra note 69, at 249-50.
Besides stabilizing the ranching industry, the Act was also designed to restore
damaged public lands, and to develop a system of leases and grazing fees for
established ranchers. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 547. In addition, the Act cre-
ated the Division of Grazing (later the Grazing Service) to implement the
scheme. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17-18.
100. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 315(f).
103. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 550-52.
104. See id. at 552.
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though the Act provided for protection of the rangeland
through regulation.' 015
b. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
and the Public Rangeland Improvement
Act
In 1976 and 1978, Congress finally produced much
needed revisions in the law, which contain sufficient author-
ity to alleviate environmental concerns. 10 6  The Federal
Land Policy and Management Act 10 7 is essentially the BLM's
"organic act."10 FLPMA does not repeal the Taylor Grazing
Act, but instead is superimposed upon it.10 9 In FLPMA's first
section, "[c]ongress declares that ... management be on the
basis of multiple use and sustained yield" and that "the pub-
lic lands be managed in a manner that will protect the qual-
ity of . . . ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values."" 0
The legislative intent behind FLPMA may be character-
ized in five broad principles: "(a) planning must precede and
control specific allocation decisions; (b) multiple use, sus-
tained yield must be implemented as the basic management
standards; (c) environmental values must be protected; (d)
public participation must be encouraged; and (e) the legisla-
ture must continue to oversee public land management and
disposition.""' The concept of multiple use remains central
to FLPMA. 12 The term evinces a method of management
105. The Taylor Grazing Act states that: "The Secretary of the Interior shall
make provision for the protection, administration, regulation, and improvement
of such grazing districts as may be created... and he shall make such rules and
regulations... to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve the land and its
resources from destruction or unnecessary injury .... " 43 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1982).
106. See infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
107. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1976) [hereinafter FLPMA].
108. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 555. The BLM, which was established by the
reorganization of two executive administrative agencies, never had formal leg-
islative authority under which agency action could be based. Id. For the first
time, FLPMA provided the BLM with official recognition and a directed mis-
sion. Id. at 555-56.
109. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 555-57 (discussing the effects that
FLPMA will have on the future public rangeland management by the BLM).
110. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7),(8) (1976).
111. George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland IV: FLPMA, PRIA,
and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (1983) [hereinafter Coggins
IV].
112. Id. at 32.
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that seeks to extract a manifold of benefits from available
natural resources while retaining long-term quantity and
quality. 113
The BLM has been slow to comply with FLPMA's multi-
ple use mandate. 114 Rather than use FLPMA to develop
much needed rangeland management reform, the BLM has
been unable to develop coherent, focused programs using the
multiple use principles. 1 15 Officials in the BLM have treated
FLPMA as an abstract statement of general policy, rather
than as a vehicle for meaningful reform." 6 As a result,
"rangeland management remains but a pale shadow of what
it ought to be."" 7
The latest legislative action which addressed rangeland
management was the Public Rangeland Improvement Act of
1978 [hereinafter PRIA]."1 S Once again, instead of giving
concrete guidance to the BLM on how to implement the legis-
lature's intent, PRIA meanders on about the precarious state
of the federal range. PRIA begins by declaring "vast seg-
ments of the public rangelands are producing less than their
113. "Multiple use" is formally defined as:
the management of the public lands and their various resource values
so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the
present and future needs of the American people; making the most ju-
dicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related serv-
ices over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic
adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the
use of some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of
balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-
term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable re-
sources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, miner-
als, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural and scenic, scientific and
historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the
various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity
of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration be-
ing given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or
the greatest unit output.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976).
114. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 556-57; see also Braun, supra note 28, at 60
n.51 (quoting Behan, Multiple Use Management: Kudos and Caveats, in NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIIJNATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEVELOPING
STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1001, 1991, 1997 (1984)).
115. See George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management, in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCHINATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEVELOPING
STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1901, 1914 (1984).
116. Id.
117. See Coggins, supra note 115, at 1914.
118. 43 U.S.C. § 1901-1908 (1979).
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potential for livestock, wildlife habitat, recreation, forage,
and water and soil conservation benefits, and for that reason
are in an unsatisfactory condition." 1 9 From there, the Act
provides appropriations for improvement projects 120 and es-
tablishes a new grazing fee formula. 12 1 Although PRIA
clearly signals Congress' desire for improvement of rangeland
conditions, the BLM has yet to implement this part of the
Act.12 2
The BLM's broad discretionary power under FLPMA and
PRIA is illustrated by the seminal rangeland management
case, National Resources Defense Council v. Hodel.123 In Ho-
del, the plaintiff brought suit to force the BLM to comply with
the mandates of PRIA and FLPMA by reducing livestock
grazing that had caused excessive and unnecessary degrada-
tion of public rangelands.124 Even though the court admitted
that livestock reduction would be "environmentally prefera-
ble, or might even be closer to what Congress had in mind,
the district court made it plain that 'the courts are not at lib-
erty to break the tie choosing one theory of range manage-
ment as superior to another.' "125 The court reasoned that the
forceful policy expressed in PRIA and FLPMA cannot "be con-
sidered concrete limits upon agency discretion."' 2 6 Thus, Ho-
del clearly evidences the vast discretion of the BLM in deter-
mining rangeland management programs under current
applicable federal legislation.
3. Rangeland Reform '94
The most recent attempt to reform rangeland adminis-
tration was embodied in "Rangeland Reform '94," the Clinton
administration's proposed general policy on public land man-
agement. 2 7 The program was first espoused in 1993, and
119. Id. § 1901(a)(1).
120. Id. § 1904.
121. Id. § 1905.
122. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 557.
123. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985).
124. Id. at 1056-58.
125. Id. at 1058 (quoting Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 (1979)).
126. Id. at 1058.
127. The BLM's notice of proposed rulemaking formally defines Rangeland
Reform '94 as:
a proposal developed by the Department of the Interior through the
BLM, in close cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture
and the FS (Forest Service), for effecting fundamental policy changes,
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emphasized increasing grazing fees as its hallmark of sweep-
ing range reforms. 128
Under the leadership of the Secretary of the Interior,
Bruce Babbitt, the BLM proposed policies and regulations
that would have dramatically affected grazing practices on
public lands.129 Rangeland Reform '94 sought to address the
economic and environmental problems associated with range-
land management. 13 0
In August 1993, the Department of the Interior officially
gave notice of its intent to reformulate grazing fees and
rangeland management regulations. 131 There were three
major shifts in policy and rules in the proposed regulations
that would have significantly changed rangeland administra-
tion. Politically, the most contentious change was the in-
crease in grazing fees from $1.86 per animal unit month to an
eventual price of $3.96 per animal unit month, an 113% in-
crease.' 32 The rise in grazing fees would have reduced the
indirect subsidization the livestock grazing industry re-
including adjustment of the Federal grazing fee, in its rangeland man-
agement program. The intent of the proposed changes is to make the
BLM's rangeland management program more compatible with ecosys-
tem management, to accelerate restoration and improvement of public
rangelands, to obtain for the public fair and reasonable compensation
for the grazing of livestock on public lands, and to streamline certain
administrative functions.
Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208 (1993) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
128. Tom Kenworthy, U.S. to Tighten Grazing Rules, Increase Fees on Public
Lands, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al.
129. See generally Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208,
43,209 (1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug.
13, 1993) (proposing changes to rangeland management in the following areas:
Grazing Advisory Boards, National Rangeland Standards and Guidelines, Per-
mit or Lease Tenure, Subleasing, Affected Interest Status, Conservation Use,
Forage Allocation, Unauthorized Use, Full Force and Effect Decisions, Sus-
pended Non-Use, Disqualification, Prohibited Acts, Ownership of Range Im-
provements, and Water Rights). The Secretary of the Interior has been strongly
involved in advocating the proposed regulations, stating: "The Clinton-Gore Ad-
ministration has delivered on its promise to reform grazing policy." U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING RANGE REFORMS;
GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).
130. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208 (1993) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
131. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING
RANGE REFORMS; GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).
132. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,203, 43,217-19 (to
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993). For a
definition of animal unit month, see supra note 10.
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ceives, 13 3 not to mention slightly reducing the overall amount
of cattle on public lands by forcing some ranchers out of busi-
ness. In addition, Grazing Advisory Boards and District Ad-
visory Councils would have been replaced by Resource Advi-
sory Councils, which were to be composed of a variety of
interest group representatives including ranchers, environ-
mentalists, business owners, and others.'14 Unlike previous
advisory councils, the expanded Resource Advisory Councils
would have provided diverse input into BLM decisions.
13
Lastly, the proposal included several revisions to BLM regu-
lations focused on encouraging ecologically responsible use
and management. 136 Land use policies were to be overhauled
to promote ecologically stable ranching.13 7 The regulatory
program was designed to reward ranchers who manage their
livestock in an ecologically responsible manner, while penal-
izing those who do not, thus potentially lessening the detri-
ment to public lands caused by environmentally insensitive
grazing practices.
13
Before the rules were approved, however, they were ab-
sorbed into an Interior Department spending bill and em-
broiled in a political battle.'39 The bill, if passed, would have
slightly reduced the proposed increase in grazing fees, but
would have retained all the other operational regulations. 40
Moreover, legislative recognition would have legitimized sub-
133. The enduring debate over grazing fees is consistently turbulent. The
federal grazing fee set for ranchers is still well below market value, as evi-
denced by corresponding grazing fees charged for use of private lands. Lynn
Ludlow, Underpayments by Overgrazers, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 16, 1993, at A12.
The average fee for grazing on private lands in 11 Western states is $10.03/
animal unit month, whereas the current BLM fee is $1.86. Id. But see John S.
Nalivka, Why the Debate and Who Will Benefit, 72 W. LIVESTOCK J. 12, 12
(1993) (arguing that the federal grazing fee does not reflect other costs of graz-
ing unlike a private grazing fee).
134. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208, 43,220-21
(1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13,
1993).
135. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
136. See Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,203, 43,210-
13 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING
RANGE REFORMS; GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).
138. Id.
139. Melissa Healy, Lawmakers OK Plan To Double U.S. Grazing Fees, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A3; Raising Grazing Fees, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14,
1993, at B6.
140. Id.
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sequent reform efforts against potentially adverse influ-
ences. 141 Consequently, when the bill reached the Senate, it
was met by a fierce western Republican filibuster. 142 The
blockage continued in Congress until the House finally
stripped the grazing fee and rangeland management provi-
sions from the bill. 143 Ultimately, Secretary Babbitt aban-
doned his plans to increase grazing fees. 144
C. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
1. Brief Overview of the Clean Water Act
The avowed purpose of the Clean Water Act is to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."1 45 In order to achieve these ends,
Congress provided that "programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an ex-
peditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to
be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources
of pollution." 4 6 The key regulatory provision of the Clean
Water Act states: "[e]xcept in compliance with this section
and sections... the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful."
47
141. See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
142. Senate Foes Hold Up Boost In Grazing Fees, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1993,
at A9.
143. Senate Lets Babbitt Decide Grazing Policy, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1993,
at A7.
144. See Tom Kenworthy, Proposal to Raise Grazing Fees is Sinking Slowly
in the West, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1995, at A23. Amazingly, the new grazing
fees are actually going down-by 19%! See id.
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). More specifically, the Clean Water Act
sought to eliminate effluent pollution discharge into navigable waters by 1985.
Id. § 1251(a)(1).
146. Id. § 1251(a)(7).
147. Id. The exceptions referred to in the provision set up the basic regula-
tory mechanisms of the Clean Water Act. They include: 1) Technology-based
effluent limitations, regulatory standards developed by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency based upon relative levels of technological feasibility. Id.
§ 1311(b). 2) Water quality related effluent limitations, which allow for stricter
limitations to meet ambient goals for a particular body of water. Id. § 1312. 3)
New source performance standards, which set stringent standards for new or
modified pollution sources. Id. § 1316. 4) Toxic and pretreatment effluent stan-
dards, that limit toxic pollutants and secretions into sewage plants. Id. § 1317.
5) The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, an elaborate permit
system which enforces, organizes and regulates water polluting sources. Id.
§ 1342. 6) Lastly, permits for dredged or fill material, which regulates dis-
charge of these materials. Id. § 1344.
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In the regulatory universe of the Clean Water Act, all
sources of pollution are classified as either "point" or
"nonpoint." A "point source of pollution" is defined by the
Clean Water Act as: "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, vessel
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged."148 For example, a pipe spewing wastes into a
body of water is a "classic" point source.
Although the term "nonpoint" is referred to in several
provisions throughout the Clean Water Act, nowhere in the
Act is it specifically defined.' 49 The EPA describes nonpoint
pollution as wastes "caused by diffuse sources that are not
regulated as point sources and [which are] normally associ-
ated with agricultural, silvilcultural, and urban runoff, runoff
from construction activities, etc."1 50 Nonpoint pollution also
commonly results from runoff from mining, landfills, and live-
stock production.1 5 1 Simply stated, a nonpoint source is any-
thing that is not a point source.152 Thus, virtually any activ-
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). "Agricultural stormwater discharges" and
"irrigation return flows" are specifically exempted from the definition of point
source. Id.
149. Congress provided that "programs for the control of nonpoint sources of
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to en-
able the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution." Id. § 1251(a)(7). In addition, nonpoint sources
are referred to in sections including, but not limited to, sections 1251, 1288,
1313(e), 1314(f), 1315(b), 1324, and 1329. Apparently, Congress felt that the
character of nonpoint sources was sufficiently vague and amorphous as to
render any attempt to define the term futile.
150. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE
3 (1987).
151. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
152. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER 146
(1986) (describing a "nonpoint source" as: "any source of water pollution or pol-
lutants not associated with a discrete conveyance"). There are as many differ-
ent definitions of "nonpoint" as there are types of nonpoint pollution. Nonpoint
sources of pollution may be defined as "any source that is not a point source
and may, with some exceptions, be roughly analogized to the common law's 'dif-
fused surface waters,' comprised mostly of runoff from land." John H. David-
son, Thinking About Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota
Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REV. 20, 21 (1989). Another authority defines nonpoint
source as "surface water runoff carr[ying] a variety of pollutants that impair
water quality." Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollu-
tion: Can it be Done? 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 479 (1989). Wisconsin, which
has incorporated the definition of nonpoint into statutory law, describes
nonpoint as "a land management activity which contributes to runoff, seepage
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ity that produces pollution not channeled through a discrete
conveyance may be a nonpoint source.
2. Regulation of Nonpoint Sources under the Clean
Water Act
Regulation of nonpoint sources involves a combination of
technological and land use controls. Because land use is
often linked to difficult political, social and economic choices,
Congress reasoned that the most logical solution to this
pressing and critical dilemma was to avoid making a deci-
sion.153 Nonpoint source legislation is addressed by two pro-
visions of the Clean Water Act.1
5 4
a. Section 208
Congress officially acknowledged the nonpoint pollution
problem in the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act.155
However, the solution was somewhat divergent from pre-ex-
isting effluent emissions and ambient water quality stan-
dards found in other parts of the Act. 156
Under section 208, state and local agencies must develop
planning provisions for both point and nonpoint pollution
sources under a general "[a]reawide waste treatment man-
agement" plan. 5 7 The planning process is commenced by the
Governor of each state, with the aid of local governments,
designating substantially polluted areas and agencies re-
sponsible for areawide planning. 158 Planning provisions
should complement effluent limitation programs by produc-
ing regulations that take into consideration unique local
circumstances. 159
or percolation which adversely affects or threatens the quality of waters of this
state and which is not a point source...." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.25(2)(b) (West
1989).
153. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 155-86 and accompanying text.
155. Robert D. Fentress, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, and the
1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 816 (1989).
156. Id. at 816-17.
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1990).
158. Id. § 1288(a)(2). If the Governor fails to designate affected areas and
responsible agencies, local governments may specify sub-standard waters and
representative organizations to develop an areawide waste management plan.
Id. § 1288(a)(4).
159. Id. § 1288(b). In addition to the areawide waste treatment manage-
ment plan, the Clean Water Act emphasizes planning in other sections. The
National Pollutant Prevention Discharge Elimination System program requires
[Vol. 351288
COWS IN HOT WATER
The Clean Water Act requires the areawide waste man-
agement plan to include "identification of the measures nec-
essary to carry out the plan."1 60 Nonpoint sources are regu-
lated under state water quality management plans that
identify "agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint
sources of pollution, including return flows from irrigated ag-
riculture, and their cumulative effects, runoff from manure
disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and crop pro-
duction, and.., set forth procedures and methods (including
land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible such
sources."
161
Specifically, agencies must set forth a detailed "manage-
ment strategy" or series of regulatory techniques, considering
economic and social factors, in order to alleviate land uses
that contribute to pollution levels above pre-established
water quality standards. 162 Owners and operators of rural
lands may enter into contracts with the federal government
to pay for implementation of "best management practices"
[hereinafter BMPs] for nonpoint pollution control pro-
grams.163 Grants are available to pay for up to 75% of the
planning process.' 64 To conclude the process, the EPA ap-
proves the plan, which is superimposed into the section
303(e) plan.165
BMPs are "control measure[s] for slowing, retaining or
absorbing pollutants produced by the surface water runoff as-
sociated with nonpoint sources."166 "Detention ponds" and
a "continuing planning process" before permits can be issued. Id. § 1313(e).
River pollution control planning is to be produced "for all basins in the United
States." Id. § 1289(a).
160. Id. § 1288(b)(1)(B),(2)(E).
161. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F).
162. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H).
163. The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water Act established the Rural
Clean Water Program, which includes economic incentives for rural land own-
ers to control nonpoint source pollution. Id. § 12880).
164. Id. § 1288(f).
165. Id. § 1288(b)(4).
166. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483. "Best Management Practices" are
defined by the EPA as:
Methods, measures or practices selected by an agency to meet its
nonpoint source control needs. BMPs include but are not limited to
structural and nonstructural controls and operation and maintenance
procedures. BMPs can be applied before, during and after pollution-
producing activities to reduce or eliminate the introduction of pollu-
tants into receiving waters.
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(1) (1988).
12891995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"infiltration trenches" are examples of BMPs used to control
nonpoint pollution.1"7
A BMP is roughly equivalent to an effluent emissions
standard, 168 such as "best available technology," with two no-
table distinctions. First, it is not clear if BMPs are technol-
ogy-forcing. Depending upon the interpretation, a BMP may
be "everything from control within the physical limits of pos-
sibility to control if convenient for the affected industry."16 9
Thus, regulators face considerable ambiguity in determining
the precise nature of a BMP. In practice, however, most
BMPs are designed considering the physical locality, costs,
and benefits of nonpoint pollution abatement.170  Second,
BMPs are practices that constitute "the most effective and
practicable means for preventing or reducing pollution gener-
ated by a nonpoint source."' 71 They do not establish regula-
tory standards or "acceptable" pollution levels.' 72  However,
water quality standards, when used in conjunction with
BMPs, can "provide an objective legal basis for controlling
nonpoint pollution."173
b. Section 319
Fifteen years after the introduction of the section 208
program, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to address
specifically the problem of nonpoint source pollution.' 74 The
1987 amendments, referred to by Congress as the Water
Quality Act, clearly express that the new nonpoint pollution
control program must be effectively and quickly developed.'
75
167. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483. Other examples of BMPs found in
EPA regulations include: "schedules of activities, prohibitions of practices,
maintenance procedures, . . .treatment requirements, operating procedures,
and practices to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste dis-
posal, or drainage from raw material storage." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1987).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988).
169. RODGERS, supra note 152, at 329.
170. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483.
171. HEADY & CHILD, supra note 46, at 461.
172. See Braun, supra note 28, at 73.
173. Id. at 74. EPA policy calls for states to design BMPs to achieve water
quality standards. Id. at 72 n.94. Water quality standards are ambient stan-
dards set by each state pertaining to individual bodies of water. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313 (1988).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988).
175. Id. § 1251(a)(7). When debating the merits of the Water Quality Act,
Senator Baucus remarked: "the real value of this legislation is the new provi-
sion representing a renewed commitment to the cleanup of nonpoint sources of
[Vol. 351290
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Under section 319, the Governor of each state must pro-
duce a "state assessment report" 176 and a "state management
program."177 The assessment report identifies waters that
will not achieve or maintain state water quality standards
without additional control measures. 178 In addition, the as-
sessment report must indicate "particular nonpoint sources
which add significant pollution" exceeding existing water
quality standards for navigable waters. 179 Lastly, the assess-
ment report must "describe[ ] the process ... for identifying
best management practices."180 The EPA then must approve
the assessment report. 81 If a state fails to submit an assess-
ment report, either a local administrative agency may de-
velop one for its own area, or alternatively the EPA has au-
thority to produce one independently.
182
Whereas the assessment report ascertains the nature
and extent of nonpoint source pollution, the state manage-
ment program sets out a regulatory program for controlling
nonpoint pollution. 18 3 The report must specify best manage-
ment practices that detail the strategy to achieve the desired
water quality standards for a particular body of water.
18 4
The state management program must also identify proce-
dures to implement the BMPs, schedules of implementation,
and sources of financial assistance. 185 If the EPA does not
approve the state management program, or the state fails to
complete one, local public organizations or agencies with
pollution and establishing a national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be implemented." 133 CONG. REC. S744 (daily ed.
Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Baucus). Senator Baucus is also a co-sponsor
of the 1993 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act. See infra note 294 and
accompanying text.
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1988).
177. Id. § 1329(b).
178. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(A).
179. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(B).
180. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(C).
181. Id. § 1329(a)(1). The EPA also approves the state management pro-
gram. Id. § 1329(b)(1).
182. See id. § 1329(d)(3), (e).
183. Id. § 1329(b)(1).
184. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A).
185. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A)-(C).
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nonpoint pollution regulation expertise may develop the pol-
lution control program.18
3. Distinguishing section 319 from section 208
As may be evident from an initial reading, the distinction
between the regulatory tools provided by sections 208 and
319 is far from drastic. In many aspects, section 319 is sim-
ply a more poignant, yet equally "toothless," section 208.187
There are, however, a few notable differences.
With respect to the identification, implementation and
encouragement of nonpoint source pollution regulation, Con-
gress made several programmatic revisions. First, section
319 requires that specific navigable bodies of water that are
threatened by nonpoint source pollution be identified,"88
whereas section 208 only required identification of nonpoint
sources in general.'8 9 Second, unlike section 208, section 319
instructs states to consider the impact of best management
practices on groundwater quality. 190 Third, section 319 plans
must include a schedule for implementation of the regulatory
process. 91 Fourth, under section 319 states must report to
the Administrator concerning timely completion of regulatory
schedules.' 92 The Administrator then reports directly to the
Congress on all progress made in reducing nonpoint source
pollution.193
Section 319 also includes $400 million in grants over a
four-year period to assist states in implementing their ap-
proved management plans. 194 In order to renew grants, state
reports to the Administrator must show "satisfactory pro-
gress" towards fulfilling the regulatory schedule. 95 In con-
trast, Section 208 does not condition renewal of grants on a
186. Id. § 1329(e). The EPA may assist the local agencies with technical ex-
pertise. Id. Section 208 has a similar provision with respect to producing area-
wide waste management plans. Id. § 1314(a)(4).
187. See infra notes 273-86 and accompanying text.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A), (B) (1988).
189. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H).
190. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A).
191. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(C).
192. Id. § 1329(h)(11).
193. Id. § 1329(m)(1). Under section 208, ultimate supervision was con-
ducted by the EPA, not Congress. Id. § 1288(b)(4)(D).
194. Id. § 1329(h)(3).
195. Id. § 1329(h)(8).
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demonstration by the states of satisfactory use of federal
funds. 196
Lastly, the EPA has authority to develop its own assess-
ment report under section 319.197 However, under both sec-
tions 319 and 208, the EPA may not produce a management
program independently. 198
4. Determination of Whether a Source is Point or
Nonpoint
Whether a source is point or nonpoint will have signifi-
cant repercussions in determining the regulatory provisions
which would apply to a particular polluting activity. Point
sources of pollution are generally regulated by technology-
based effluent standards, essentially requiring generators of
effluent waste emissions to reduce their discharge of specific
pollutants to pre-established levels, specified in their per-
mits, using varying levels of available technology to achieve
the required rates. 199 Nonpoint regulation is essentially left
to the will of the states or, in absence of state action, the gov-
erning administrative agency.' °°
Occasionally, a nonpoint source will be regulated as a
point source. This usually occurs when an adequate waste
gathering mechanism exists that would allow for the normal
point source regulatory process to be carried out.20 1 In
United States v. Earth Sciences,"' a gold leaching facility in
Colorado operated by Earth Sciences produced pollution as a
result of spraying cyanide over gold ore so that gold could be
extracted from the ore.203 The excess cyanide was drained
into a sump.20 4 During a warm spring, a nearby blanket of
196. Id. § 1288(f).
197. Id. § 1329(d)(3).
198. Fentress, supra note 155, at 818, 825.
199. Id. §§ 1311, 1342. The principal levels of technology employed are clas-
sified as "best practicable technology," "best conventional technology," and "best
available technology economically achievable," Id. § 1314(b)(4)(B).
200. See supra notes 157-65, 176-86 and accompanying text.
201. For example, a discrete conveyance from which pollution samples could
be taken, from which emissions could be calculated, and which could be regu-
lated under the NPDES permit program.
202. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
203. Id. at 370.
204. Id. A "sump" is "a pit for draining, collecting, or storing liquids." WEB-
STER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1426 (2d ed. 1976).
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snow melted causing the sump to overflow, and washing cya-
nide into the Rito Seco Creek below.2" 5
The EPA brought suit, alleging three separate instances
of effluent standard violations under the Clean Water Act.20 6
As a point source, the EPA identified a ditch through which
the cyanide polluted water ran that could serve as a discrete
conveyance for monitoring pollution levels.20 v The court held
that although the facility was not a classic point source, it
would contravene "the intent of the FWPCA [Clean Water
Act] and the structure of the statute to exempt from regula-
tion any activity that emits pollution from an identifiable
point."20 0 The court reasoned that the pollution could be reg-
ulated much like point sources, and that the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Water Act supported their conclusion.20 9
One year later in Sierra Club v. Abston Construction
Co.,210 the Fifth Circuit held that a coal mining operation
could be regulated as a point source. In Abston, runoff from
rain and water draining resulted in excess silt and acid de-
posits in nearby streams. Although the court acknowledged
that some mining operations were nonpoint sources, the facil-
ity in this case was considered a point source. 211 The court
explained that "[s]imple erosion over the material surface, re-
sulting in the discharge of water and other materials into
navigable waters, does not constitute a point source dis-
charge, absent some effort to change the surface, to direct the
waterflow or otherwise impede its progress."212 It did not
matter that the channeling action resulting in waste dis-
charge was not put in place by the coal mining operation "so
long as they are reasonably likely to be the means by which
pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of
water."
2 13
The Water Quality Act directly limited the impact of the
United States v. Earth Sciences214 line of cases. First, "agri-
205. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 370.
206. Id. at 371.
207. United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979).
208. Id. at 373.
209. Id.
210. 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
211. Id. at 43.
212. Id. at 45.
213. Id. at 45.
214. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
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cultural stormwater discharges" were specifically excluded
from the definition of point source.215 Second, section 402
prevented the Administrator from issuing a permit to regu-
late "discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations
or oil and gas exploration . . . composed entirely of flows
which are from conveyances .-. . used for collecting and con-
veying precipitation runoff and which are not contaminated
by contact with ... waste products located on the site of the
operation. "216 As a result, stormwater runoff from agricul-
ture and runoff from mining or oil and gas operations, have
been exempted from permitting requirements.2 17
However, the Earth Sciences rationale may still be appli-
cable in other contexts, including livestock grazing. A recent
case on point is Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra,2 18 in which
a coalition of concerned citizens sued to enjoin discharge of
raw sewage which had been pouring from a housing develop-
ment into the Sakonnet River since 1969.219 The court ana-
lyzed the definition of "point source," ultimately concluding
that "[1]iability must lie with the person or persons causing
the 'addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.' "220 The
court's decision was based on prior case law that "broadly in-
terpreted the definition of point source to reach all pollution
that comes from a confined system."221 The appropriate re-
medial action was to require the dischargers to obtain a
permit.222
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
216. Id. § 1342()(2). "Stormwater" regulation is a related concept to
nonpoint source pollution, but is addressed separately by the Clean Water Act.
See id. § 1342(p). The general rule with respect to stormwater is that prior to
October 1, 1994, permits are not required for discharges composed entirely of
stormwater. Id. § 1342(p)(1). However, there are several exceptions. Permits
are required for stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity, mu-
nicipal separate storm sewers serving a population of more than 100,000, or
any discharge the Administrator deems is violating water quality standards.
Id. § 1342(p)(2). After October 1, 1994, permits will be mandatory for
stormwater discharge. See id. § 1342(p)(1).
217. Id. § 1342()(2).
218. 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990).
219. Id. at 626.
220. Id. at 630.
221. Id. at 629.
222. Id. at 631, 632.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The State of the Range
1. Focusing in on Reality
All interests agree that public range and riparian areas
are continually deteriorating. Environmentalists and some
public interest groups contend that riparian areas have en-
dured massive destruction since the 1800s.223 The General
Land Office report on the state of the range stated: "80% of
the 1,036 miles inventoried were in poor or fair condition. "224
Clearly, a serious problem exists on America's public range-
lands. However, the exact extent of deterioration remains
still unclear.
2. Inadequacy of Riparian Area Restoration Policies
Studies have substantially proven that riparian areas
can recover if livestock are prevented from grazing in the vi-
cinity.225 Ranching interests who deny the detrimental effect
of riparian area grazing, basing their conclusions on experi-
ence, are contradicted by the BLM's own riparian manage-
ment policy.226 In its report on restoring riparian areas, the
GAO determined that it was possible, given ideal circum-
stances, for restoration of riparian areas to be accomplished
by changing grazing techniques. 227 One alternative is protec-
tive measures which would entail construction of fences, iso-
lated watering units, and drainage ditches. 228 In many cases,
development of these devices could be prohibitively
expensive.229
The GAO's own report suggests, however, that the best
riparian zone recovery occurred when livestock were excluded
or reduced in the area. 230 Clearly, this would be the simplest
and safest protective policy.
223. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99; Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1008-09.
224. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 48. See also Braun, supra note 28, at
68.
225. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 12, 17.
226. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
227. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at
53).
228. Id. at 54-57.
229. Braun, supra note 28, at 50 n.16.
230. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3,
at 53).
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Riparian area protection policies which allow contempo-
raneous restoration and grazing practices will continue to re-
sult in incomplete riparian area recovery. 231 The consistent
error in government agency restoration policies is the belief
that livestock grazing and healthy riparian areas can coexist,
when the bulk of the agency's own investigations strongly
suggest that they cannot.
Livestock prohibition from riparian areas is needed to
save the public rangeland. The scarce forage and water re-
sources present in riparian areas, however, serve as a vital
element of livestock grazing.23 2 Denying ranchers access to
these zones would result in increased costs borne out in con-
struction of new watering structures and decreases in the
number of cattle grazing upon the range.233
B. Limitations on the Existing Regulatory Framework
Despite a history of administrative resistance and indif-
ference to environmentally responsible rangeland manage-
ment, recent executive activity germinated hope that signifi-
cant improvement in the environmental stability of BLM
lands would be forthcoming.234 Unfortunately, recent re-
forms were never consummated.23 5 Although the BLM has
recognized that a problem does exist,23 6 remedial administra-
tive action is limited in effectiveness. As a result, change in
public land stewardship via the administrative process
presents an arduous and uncertain endeavor.
1. Political Pressures
The transitory nature of administrative regulations is
susceptible to political pressures.237 Political difficulties in-
herent in the rulemaking process are illustrated by the insti-
tutional conflicts that have characterized the current reform
process.238 The intense political debate over Rangeland Re-
form '94, which pitted maintenance of environmental quality
against economic concerns, will not fade into oblivion.
231. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
232. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 6; Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1004.
233. Braun, supra note 28, at 50 n.16.
234. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
236. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
237. GARY LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE 9 (1981).
238. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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In addition to outside political forces, bureaucratic resist-
ance to agency reform has become an anticipated administra-
tive response.2 39 After all, the BLM:
is one of the least known and most parochial organs of the
federal establishment. Underfunded, understaffed, and
without an effective constituency, it proclaims the best of
intentions but refuses to stand up to opposition by the ma-
jor rangeland users. It was conceived in politics of the
worst kind, brought up to believe that accommodation ou-
tranks science or professionalism, and is undergoing the
crisis of ineffectual middle age.
2 4 0
Hence, fleeting political rewards, limitations in resource allo-
cation from legislators, and bureaucratic entrenchment all
contribute to agency ineffectiveness.
2. Misdirected Reforms
FLPMA and PRIA vest the BLM with the authority to
manage the public rangelands. 241 Except for a few scattered
sections, however, rangeland management is mainly a matter
of discretion.242 As Hodel demonstrated,243 the concept of
multiple use has been generally regarded as a broad policy
orientation, devoid of substantive requirements.244
It was hoped that the Rangeland Reform '94 program
would have eased the burden on damaged federal lands.
However, even assuming the proposals were eventually im-
plemented, Rangeland Reform '94 never directly addressed
the crucial issue of excessive livestock grazing on the public
range.2 45
Furthermore, Rangeland Reform '94 proposed imposing
negative and positive reinforcements on ranchers in order to
improve environmental quality.246 While these measures
make perfect political sense, it is uncertain to what extent
they would have been successful, because their success de-
239. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of
Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 300 (1994).
240. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 87.
241. See BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; see also Braun, supra note 28, at
62-63.
242. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
244. Coggins IV, supra note 111, at 19-20.
245. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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pended upon the grazing industry's response. Certainly the
potential existed for environmental degradation to be re-
duced, but the time frame and scope of reforms were difficult
to assess. Merely restructuring management policy and in-
creasing grazing fees may not have sufficiently reduced cattle
grazing in an amount necessary to allow the public rangeland
to recover. In addition, the possibility remained that the re-
forms would be completely ineffective. In comparison, direct
reform based on statutory authority, which does not rely on a
reactionary ranching industry, retains a greater measure of
certainty in its effectiveness.247
Even if the BLM has undergone a major policy overhaul,
the damage to the public rangeland, and especially to sensi-
tive riparian ecosystems, can best be abated by a reduction in
the amount of livestock allowed to graze on public lands.
248
The report of the General Accounting Office on the status of
riparian areas on federal land supports this proposition.
249
To protect riparian areas and effectively maintain the public
range, grazing should be directly reduced or prohibited on
federal lands.
C. Applicability of the Clean Water Act to Rangeland
Management
1. Riparian Area Regulation as a Vehicle for Change
BLM management of public rangelands is subject to the
constraints of federal law as required by FLPMA.
250 As a re-
sult, the management of riparian areas is unique in that it
requires the regulating agency comply not only with assorted
federal rangeland laws, but also with the mandates of the
Clean Water Act.251 Thus, the riparian area, which serves as
247. See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
248. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100. This is not to downplay the po-
tential for success of a program like Rangeland Reform '94. If properly imple-
mented, Rangeland Reform '94 could have significantly reduced environmental
degradation. Nothing from past or present experience, however, suggests that
the agency or the ranching industry will cooperate. See supra notes 114-17,
239-40 and accompanying text.
249. Id. (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 48).
250. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(C)(8) (1982). The BLM must also act in compliance
will all applicable state laws. Id.
251. The relevant section reads:
Each... agency... of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants,.., shall be
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the heart of the rangeland ecosystem, may also serve as a ve-
hicle for rangeland reform via the applicable regulatory pro-
visions of the Clean Water Act.
The Clean Water Act seeks to "maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."252
Water affected by livestock grazing mostly likely falls under
the rubric of Clean Water Act regulation, since "Congress in-
tended to regulate discharges made into every creek, stream,
river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate
commerce."2 53 Moreover, the Clean Water Act specifically rec-
ognizes the need for protection of waters associated with
"land used for livestock" in its nonpoint regulatory
program.254
The uncertainty involved in determining the pollution
source "status" of livestock grazing under the Clean Water
Act merits application of both point and nonpoint source
analyses. Each management program has inherent benefits
and drawbacks.255
2. Regulation of Livestock Grazing as a Point Source
While pollution caused by livestock grazing is most prop-
erly considered nonpoint,256 supplemental environmental fac-
tors may exist which would allow for the normal point source
regulatory procedures to be used.257 The rationale behind
this inexact regulatory method is evident in the Earth Sci-
ences line of authority.2 58 In United States v. Earth Sci-
ences, 259 the emphasis was on the existence of an adequate
"gathering mechanism," in this case a "sump," which served
to justify application of the standard point source regulatory
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
specting the control and abatement of water pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1990). See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1990).
253. See United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (1990).
255. Potential solutions are addressed in section V. See discussion infra part
V.
256. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 201-22 and accompanying text.
259. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
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tools. 260 Despite the admitted fact that the actual source of
pollution was not "confined or discrete,"26 1 and thus by statu-
tory definition was not a "point source,"262 the existence of
polluted federal waters influenced the court to set aside stat-
utory discrepancies in favor of protecting valuable water re-
sources.263 However, effluent emission standards have not
been imposed in subsequent cases involving similar "gather-
ing mechanisms."2 64
Oftentimes, cattle congregate in a limited segment along
a protected watercourse that has been left unprotected.265
These "water gaps" are sacrifice areas where the concentra-
tion of water pollutants is normally excessive.266 Potentially,
effluent limitations based on the monitoring of water taken
from water gaps could be established and a permit system
implemented to regulate livestock grazing near those water
sources.
Satisfactory gathering mechanisms which would make
regulation possible, however, must first be identified.
Whether a particular riparian area or individual water gap
would fit the required description is unclear.2 67 Riparian ar-
eas that have established water gaps could be considered as
possible pollution sources capable of being regulated as a
point source.268
Unfortunately, other riparian zones do not have ade-
quate circumstances sufficient to consider regulation on a
point source basis. Many riparian zones are sensitive arid
260. Id. at 374. The standard regulatory tools are effluent limitations and
permits. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
261. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
262. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
263. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
264. See, e.g., Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686
F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to determine, without an eviden-
tiary hearing, that an adjunct drainage ditch next to a landfill could act as a
satisfactory point source in order to enforce effluent standards).
265. See Braun, supra note 28, at 71 n.88. The riparian area is fenced in, but
a gap is left open for cattle to water themselves. Id.
266. Id.
267. As previously discussed, riparian areas come in a variety of forms. See
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
268. In June 1994, an environmental coalition brought suit claiming that
federal grazing permits fall under the jurisdiction of section 401 the Clean
Water Act. See Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan. 26, 1995) available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File. If successful, federal grazing permits would be
subject to a variety of CWA regulatory mechanisms, including effluent limita-
tions and water quality standards. Id.
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meadow ecosystems, where monitoring would be impractica-
ble.2 69 In some instances, no pre-existing gathering mecha-
nism is apparent, rendering moot any type of point source
regulation. Thus, while regulation of livestock grazing in the
standard Clean Water Act point source program may success-
fully restore some areas, other damaged areas would not be
protected by such a program.
In attempting to formulate a large-scale regulatory pro-
gram, it is desirable that as broad a spectrum of pollution
sources as possible is covered. Regulation of nonpoint sources
as point sources is dubious and has questionable practicality
because the overall program probably will not be uniform.
3. Regulation of Livestock Grazing as a Nonpoint
Source
Nonpoint regulation has two key advantages over a com-
parable point source program. First, regulation of grazing
through a nonpoint source system involves a comprehensive
approach which can regulate all public lands, in contrast to
the selective approach of a point source program.2 7 ° Second,
nonpoint regulation does not require special extrinsic ele-
ments needed for the point source regulatory process.271
Regulation of livestock grazing also falls more comforta-
bly into the category of nonpoint source pollution regulation.
This is because pollution produced as a result of livestock
grazing does not originate at any one discrete conveyance,
but is actually a result of an inadequate land use policy.
272
An areawide waste management plan which specifically
deals with livestock grazing appears ideal. There are, how-
ever, several limitations inherent in the nonpoint regulatory
program that render this form of regulation superficial.
a. Failures of Section 208
As might be expected, there are a number of problems
with the practical implementation of section 208. First, "the
short time frame allowed for the planning process, erratic
269. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94 (describing the various types of riparian
zones).
270. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
272. The Clean Water Act addresses pollution caused by livestock as a land
use problem to be regulated as a nonpoint source. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)
(1990).
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federal funding, and lack of adequate data," create intergov-
ernmental conflicts at the regional level. 3 States resent fed-
eral control, regional agencies resent state control, and local
governments resent regional control.274 This cycle of regula-
tory power conflicts, coupled with statutory inadequacies, re-
sults in inefficient and ineffective development and imple-
mentation of the areawide waste management programs.
Second, the EPA does not have the authority to develop
its own areawide waste management plan if it rejects a state
plan.275 In addition, while the EPA may propose methods of
nonpoint pollution regulation, it may not enforce those regu-
lations. 6 Thus, the EPA's role in the program includes
making suggestions and stamping approval of state plans.
States have the authority to decide what plan will be devel-
oped and whether they will enforce it. 277 As one author
noted: "[t]he primary reason that section 208 is not taken se-
riously by most states is because they don't have to ... With-
out some substantial encouragement by federal carrots or
sticks, state governments are naturally going to shy away
from such tasks."278
b. Failures of Section 319
Many commentators point to lack of sufficient enforce-
ment provisions in section 319 as the critical weak point of
the nonpoint source management program.279 Section 319
does not require states to submit either an assessment report
273. See ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
384 (1990). For a detailed analysis of barriers impeding state and local efforts
to control nonpoint pollution, see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
WATER POLLUTION: GREATER EPA LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO REDUCE NONPOINT
SOURCE POLLUTION (Oct. 1990).
274. ANDERSON, supra note 273, at 384.
275. The EPA's limited ability to affect areawide management plans includes
rejection of the state's plan or withdrawal of EPA approval of the plan. 33
U.S.C. § 1288(b)(4)(D) (1990). In addition, the EPA may withhold grants for
public works not in conformity with the plan. Id. § 1288(d).
276. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
277. Davidson, supra note 152, at 43-44.
278. 2 J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, WATER POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS
WASTE 215 (1986) (emphasis in original) quoted in Robert D. Fentress,
Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Sec-
tion 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 822 (1989).
279. See Mandelker, supra note 152, at 486; see also Fentress, supra note
155, at 825.
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or a management program.280 Although the Administrator
has the authority to develop a limited assessment report,28 '
the EPA may not produce a management program to effectu-
ate the assessment report. 282 While the assessment report
identifies nonpoint sources, the management program re-
quires deciding difficult and multifarious land use choices,
and thus is the most important practical element of section
3 19.2813 Furthermore, although local expert agencies may de-
velop their own management program if the state fails to pro-
duce one, in practice this rarely occurs because local organi-
zations resist making divisive land use modifications.28 4
Under section 319, the EPA has no authority to force
states to clean up identified sources of nonpoint pollution.28 5
States are left to their own devices in determining whether
they will enforce the management program.286 Voluntary
state action on controversial issues requires national commit-
ment. Section 319 fails to provide states with adequate gui-
dance, support, and disincentives to enforce their nonpoint
source management programs.
c. Political and Economic Factors
Land use often entails difficult social, political, and eco-
nomic choices which local governments have traditionally de-
cided, and in which the federal government has been reluc-
tant to interfere.28 7 Recent legislative proposals of funds for
national nonpoint source regulation range from 230 to 500
million dollars.288 Moreover, the modification of land use
practices affects the way people live and work. Drastic
changes in favor of environmental control are resisted due to
concerns over their economic impact.28 9 Local governments
280. Davidson, supra note 152, at 44.
281. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3) (1990).
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
285. Section 309, the standard enforcement section of the Clean Water Act,
does not apply to nonpoint sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1990).
286. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
287. James C. Buresh, State and Federal Land Use Regulation: An Applica-
tion to Groundwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433,
1433 (1986).
288. Clean Water Bills Focus on Nonpoint Pollution, Toxic MATERIAL NEws,
July 28, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file.
289. See Mandelker, supra note 152, at 490.
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often share similar concerns and are even more apt to ignore
expensive regulation of pollution that will most likely, even-
tually, end up in another jurisdiction.29 °
There is a conspicuous absence of meaningful enforce-
ment of nonpoint regulation.29 ' Problems associated with
livestock grazing are not unknown to the federal government.
Recent legislative action shows that there are influential
forces working both sides of the grazing issue.292 Congress
has not yet been willing to take a stand, nor to force the
states to decide. The end result of the legislative deadlock is
that the task falls upon the Bureau of Land Management, an
agency whose attitude towards rangeland management re-
form is suspect.293
IV. PROPOSAL
The water pollution and rangeland degradation stem-
ming from livestock grazing give rise to a series of challeng-
ing and controversial issues. However, the condition of the
public range is deplorable and the need for rangeland man-
agement reform urgent. It is time to address the problem of
livestock before it is too late.
Given recent developments, it appears that nonpoint
source pollution regulation will be revamped through a series
of amendments to the Clean Water Act.294 A major part of
these new laws should directly address the problem of live-
stock grazing on public rangelands. Legislative recognition of
livestock grazing as a type of nonpoint source pollution will
not only help to legitimize the movement for reform, but will
also assist in any subsequent judicial inquiries regarding the
issue.
New amendments to the Clean Water Act should place
responsibility and accountability for creation and implemen-
290. Id. at 489-90.
291. See supra notes 275-78, 285 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 80-89, 114-17, 236-40 and accompanying text.
294. New nonpoint legislation may be promulgated if the Clean Water Act is
reauthorized. The "Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1993
(WPPCA)," was introduced into Congress on June 15, 1993. See S. 1114, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Nonpoint source pollution has been a major issue in the
congressional debate. See Key CWA Reauthorization Players Gearing Up for
Hill Battle in 1994, AIR WATER POLLUTION REPORT, Dec. 6, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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tation of new nonpoint regulatory programs with the states.
Penalties, deadlines, and enforcement provisions must be es-
tablished so that states can no longer defer resolution of
these land use issues.
295
The new amendments should not only make nonpoint
regulation of livestock grazing a mandatory obligation, but
should also provide adequate guidelines for states in carrying
out Congress' intent.296 General guidance for nonpoint pro-
grams regarding livestock grazing should be provided. First,
water quality standards for riparian zones must be set by the
states and approved by the EPA. Subsequently, the states
should identify "best management practices" reflecting best
economically feasible technology to achieve acceptable water
quality standards. An essential element in developing best
management practices is to discard the notion that range-
lands can coexist with massive livestock intrusions.2 97 Thus,
295. While the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act purports to force
state action, see S. 1114 § 304(a)(1)(c)(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)), there
are several "loopholes." First, states have seven years to review and revise
their plans after the Act becomes law. Id. Second, upon a showing of "economic
incapability," a polluter will be exempted from management program standards
and the enforcement provisions. Id. § 304(a)(1)(E) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329
(1990)).
296. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act attempts to address
this need. Within 30 months of enactment of the bill, all states must revise
their management programs to specify their phased management strategy for
existing and new nonpoint sources of pollution, identify all targeted or priority
watersheds, establish an implementation schedule, and develop a process for
determining nonpoint source pollutant load reductions, critical sites, and BMPs
for targeted watersheds. S. 1114 § 304(a)(6) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329
(1990)).
Unlike under the existing nonpoint source regulatory legislation, if a state
fails to submit a revised management program, or if the Administrator does not
approve the plan, the EPA must develop its own enforceable nonpoint manage-
ment programs. Id. § 304(a)(5)(A)-(B) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)).
To assist the states, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency is re-
quired to produce the "National Guidance Program (NGP)." S. 1114 § 304(c)
(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)). The National Guidance Program will in-
clude descriptions of nonpoint source categories and subcategories, appropriate
implementation criteria and management measures for use in evaluating state
programs, methods to estimate pollutant load reductions to protect and pro-
mote water quality, and monitoring techniques for control of nonpoint sources.
Id. However, to provide added flexibility for states in developing control meas-
ures, regional administrative agencies may adopt site-specific plans that reflect
local concerns as an alternative to federal management measures. Id. § 304(0
(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)). The hope is that states will have an objec-
tive basis on which to develop their management programs in order to receive
federal grants.
297. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
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management programs must include reduction of livestock on
federal lands to ecologically and economically2 98 responsible
levels. Happily, in the case of livestock grazing, these two
objectives are not mutually exclusive.299
Second, states should be encouraged to isolate and de-
velop "gathering mechanisms" in applicable areas, so that ef-
fluent limitations, monitoring data, and a permitting pro-
gram can be readily established. 30 0 Although this approach
does not address all sources of nonpoint pollution, the poten-
tial benefits in riparian area restoration make these reforms
reasonable. Such reforms have the additional benefit of im-
mediate impact.3 1
The administrative role should also be clearly defined.
The EPA should be required to develop applicable BMPs
when states fail to take the initiative. The BLM should be
responsible for implementing these procedures, through both
revision of grazing techniques, as well as increases in base
grazing fees.
The recent debate over grazing fees, Rangeland Reform
'94, and the untenable quality of public lands signal impend-
ing change. The revision of nonpoint source pollution man-
agement plans proposed in this comment does not attempt to
restore the public range to its original pristine state, but
merely to encourage the conservation of the public range.30 2
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, livestock grazing is the largest single cause of
degradation to public lands. The public rangeland cannot
sustain the extraordinary number of livestock currently graz-
ing on it without severe ecological repercussions. Most live-
stock congregate in riparian areas. They are often the
298. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
301. Of course, with or without new Clean Water Act amendments, the path
of judicial supervision is clear for potential degraded federal waters that fall
within the Earth Sciences parameters. See supra note 268 and accompanying
text.
302. "Conservationism" is a natural resource use philosophy that seeks to
maximize beneficial uses of the environment for as long a term as possible. See
generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959) (describing the his-
torical development and philosophical content of the conservationist
movement).
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lushest and most fertile areas on the range, as well as vital
elements of the rangeland ecosystem. They are also easily
damaged. Livestock tend to overgraze in these areas, result-
ing in water pollution, soil degradation, wildlife habitat de-
struction, and other associated ecological ills. Management
devices aimed at reducing the burden on riparian areas have
been successful primarily when livestock are prevented from
grazing in those areas.
Historically, the BLM, the agency responsible for manag-
ing the public rangelands, has shown little interest in main-
taining the biological integrity of riparian areas. Given the
failure of recent reform efforts, it is uncertain whether the
administrative regulatory revisions will overcome political
pressures.
The solution could lie in regulation of riparian areas on
public land through the Clean Water Act. Pollution caused
by livestock grazing is usually characterized as "nonpoint."
Nonpoint wastes are not ejected from a discrete and measura-
ble conveyance, but are instead carried into regulated waters
by runoff. Pollution of this type has commonly been regu-
lated by two methods. The first seeks to apply a permitting
program to sources of nonpoint pollution if normal point
source structures exist that would facilitate regulation. The
drawback of this method is that not all riparian areas on fed-
eral rangelands qualify, thus resulting in sporadic regulation.
The second regulatory method constructs areawide land use
plans to manage all pollution caused by nonpoint sources.
Unfortunately, lack of federal statutory authority has al-
lowed states to circumvent successful reform.
Ultimately, the key elements that should be extracted
from both regulatory programs are development of particular
water quality standards for riparian areas, best management
practices featuring reduced numbers of livestock on federal
rangelands, and initial development of regulatory devices in
accessible riparian areas. Overarching these reforms is the
need for government accountability in areawide waste treat-
ment plan development. If the public rangeland is to be con-
served, policy revision using the nonpoint source pollution
provisions of the Clean Water Act offers a cogent and promis-
ing solution to the problem of rangeland degradation.
Brian L. Frank
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